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I. INTRODUCTION
Conflict of laws cases seldom generate much public attention. But like an
intercollegiate sports team from a mid-major conference,1 the subject of con-
flict of laws finds the national spotlight once each decade or so, and devoted (if
long-suffering) fans hope for an impressive showing when their moment arises.
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague2 is surely not a serious contender for, as this
Symposium ponders, the worst Supreme Court decision ever. But for this devo-
tee and teacher of conflicts, the case is the worst of its kind and a missed
opportunity on the national stage. And unfortunately, the consequences of that
failure linger—in the courtroom and in my classroom.
In Allstate, the Court confronted a situation where a state court applied
forum law to a set of facts that had essentially no connection to that state. The
dubious relevance of forum law forced the Court to confront the principal con-
stitutional underpinnings of conflicts doctrine, namely the Due Process and Full
Faith and Credit Clauses. Importantly, these two clauses have profoundly dif-
ferent histories and fundamentally different purposes. Yet the Court reduced
the commands of both into one muddled test—frankly, the sort of jumble that
one sees on mediocre law exams. My principal criticism, then, is the Court’s
analytical framework: the collapse of two distinct constitutional questions into
one. These clauses deserve better, and so do my conflicts students.
On a lighter note, I challenge all students of Supreme Court jurisprudence
to find a more compelling example of this phenomenon. A better example
would have to draw upon two clauses of the U.S. Constitution as discrete and
distinct as these. And the Court must, within one opinion, conclude that both
clauses are controlling and also that both clauses pose the same constitutional
question. Whether unprecedented or simply unusual, the combination of the
Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses into a single test in conflicts
cases is unfortunate and problematic. In this Essay, I will briefly describe the
Court’s decision in Allstate and then outline why the case is a candidate for the
Hall of Shame.
* Professor of Law, University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law.
1 Consider our gracious hosts: the Runnin’ Rebels of the University of Nevada-Las Vegas
are a consistent performer in the Mountain West athletic conference and an occasional par-
ticipant on the national stage—winning the 1990 NCAA Men’s Basketball Championship,
for example.
2 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
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II. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE CASE
Allstate involved the death of Ralph Hague who died as a result of injuries
he sustained in a motorcycle accident in 1974.3 Ralph’s son was driving the
motorcycle, on which Ralph was a passenger, when an automobile struck the
motorcycle from behind.4 Ralph and his son were citizens of Wisconsin, as was
the negligent driver.5 The two vehicles involved in the accident were registered
in Wisconsin, and the fatal accident occurred in Wisconsin.6
Both the negligent driver and Ralph’s son were uninsured.7 However,
Ralph carried uninsured motorist coverage on each of three vehicles that he
owned.8 Each of those three policies provided for up to $15,000 of coverage for
injuries caused by the negligence of uninsured motorists, regardless of whether
the accident involved the insured vehicle.9 Ralph’s cars were registered in Wis-
consin and were insured by a policy obtained in Wisconsin from a Wisconsin
branch of Allstate.10
The decedent’s personal representative, Ralph’s widow, Lavina Hague,
filed a declaratory judgment action in Minnesota.11 After the accident, she had
moved to Minnesota and married a Minnesota resident.12 In the suit, Lavina
sought a declaration that the uninsured motorist coverage on each of the dece-
dent’s automobile policies could be “stacked.”13 Minnesota law allowed an
insured to “stack” the three policies; Wisconsin law did not allow stacking.14
Pursuant to Minnesota law, then, her recovery would be $45,000 instead of the
$15,000 that Wisconsin law would allow.15
Notwithstanding the tenuous connection with Minnesota, the Minnesota
trial and appeals courts applied forum law.16 And on certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed. Writing for a plurality of four justices, Justice
Brennan stated that in order to be consistent with the Due Process Clause and
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Minnesota must have had a “significant con-
tact or significant aggregation of contacts” with the parties and the occurrence
such that the choice of law would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.17
There were only three facts or contacts that purported to support the appli-
cation of Minnesota law. First, Allstate did substantial business in the state.18
This contact was arguably relevant because it minimized any claim by Allstate
3 Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Minn. 1978).
4 Id.
5 Allstate, 449 U.S. at 305.
6 Id. at 305, 316.
7 Id. at 305.
8 Id.
9 Id. at n.3.
10 Id. at 305, 316
11 Id. at 305; Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Minn. 1978).
12 Allstate, 449 U.S. at 305.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 305–06.
15 Id.
16 See Hague, 289 N.W.2d at 43.
17 Allstate, 449 U.S. at 313, 320. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration or deci-
sion of the case.
18 Id. at 317–18.
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that they would be unfairly surprised as to the content or relevance of Minne-
sota law. But as applied here, this contact was dubious because the loss had
nothing to do with any of Allstate’s Minnesota business; surely, say, Nevada
law could not be applied to this insurance policy and automobile accident even
if Allstate did substantial business there. Second, prior to the accident Mr.
Hague had been a member of Minnesota’s work force for fifteen years.19 This
contact implicated certain “police power responsibilities” owed to non-resident
employees.20 But it is not at all clear why Minnesota’s police power responsi-
bilities over non-resident employees extended to insurance policies and auto-
mobile accidents unrelated to Mr. Hague’s employment status (since he was not
commuting to/from work or otherwise engaged in work-related activity at the
time of contracting nor at the time of the accident). Third, and finally, Mrs.
Hague had moved to Minnesota prior to filing the suit.21 But the Court had
previously held that in light of the serious potential for forum shopping, a post-
occurrence change in residency could not create an interest in the forum suffi-
cient to justify the application of that law.22 Nevertheless, the plurality relied
on the “aggregation” of these three contacts to satisfy the constitutional
threshold.
Justice Stevens concurred with the plurality’s judgment, but emphasized
that the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses were designed to further
different policies and required separate analyses.23 He wrote that the Due Pro-
cess Clause protected individuals from choice of law determinations that result
in unfair surprise;24 and the Full Faith and Credit Clause protected sovereign
interests from encroachment by other states.25 Justice Stevens concurred with
the plurality because, with regard to the Due Process Clause, Allstate was not
unfairly surprised by the application of Minnesota law26 and, as to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, because there was no evidence of encroachment upon
Wisconsin’s sovereign interests.27
Justice Powell’s dissent, which was joined by two other justices, accepted
the plurality’s statement that the “significant contacts creating state interests”
standard governed state choice-of-law determinations under both the Due Pro-
cess and Full Faith and Credit Clauses.28 However, in applying the test, the
dissenters analyzed the case separately under each clause. The dissenters
thought the Due Process Clause was satisfied because it was within the reason-
able expectation of the parties (before the cause of action accrued) that Minne-
sota law might apply.29 But the dissenters could not find any interest that
19 Id. at 313–14.
20 Id. at 314.
21 Id. at 318–19.
22 See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 182 (1936).
23 Allstate, 449 U.S. at 320.
24 Id. at 327.
25 Id. at 322.
26 Id. at 330.
27 Id. at 325.
28 Id. at 332.
29 Id. at 336.
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Minnesota had in the controversy; Minnesota’s contacts were either trivial or
illegitimate.30
III. THE MISSED OPPORTUNITY
The Minnesota courts were brazen: they applied forum law to determine
how a contract that had been entered into by Wisconsin parties in Wisconsin
should be interpreted in light of an automobile accident that occurred in Wis-
consin involving Wisconsin parties.31 But of course the Supreme Court’s
review focused on the constitutionality rather than the wisdom of that choice-
of-law determination.32
Since the 1940s, the Court has held that the Constitution does not pre-
scribe a single governing law by which the facts giving rise to a lawsuit must
be controlled; rather, the Constitution merely polices the set of possible solu-
tions—curbing excesses in state choice-of-law doctrine.33 There are several
clauses of the U.S. Constitution that could be implicated by a choice-of-law
analysis,34 but historically, as today, attention has focused primarily on the Due
Process Clause35 and the Full Faith and Credit Clause.36
My principal criticism of this case is the combination of the constitutional
tests under the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses into a single test.
But Allstate is not alone to blame for that synthesis.37 As Justice Brennan
noted, the two clauses had imposed different requirements “at one time,” but
the Court had since “taken a similar approach in deciding choice-of-law cases
under both [clauses].”38 To be sure, a careless slouch had begun prior to All-
state; but the merger was not fully consummated and Allstate could have
30 Id. at 337.
31 James Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REV. 872, 887
(1980). The Minnesota courts are notorious for applying forum law in extreme situations.
See Linda Silberman, Can the State of Minnesota Bind the Nation? Federal Choice-of-Law
Constraints after Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 103, 112 (1981);
Harold P. Southerland, Sovereignty, Value Judgments, and Choice of Law, 38 BRANDEIS L.J.
451, 486 (2000).
32 This is a point that Justice Brennan emphasized at the outset of his opinion. See Allstate,
449 U.S. at 307 (“It is not for this Court to say whether the choice-of-law analysis . . . is to
be preferred or whether we would make the same choice-of-law decision if sitting as the
Minnesota Supreme Court. Our sole function is to determine whether the Minnesota
Supreme Court’s choice of its own substantive law in this case exceeded federal constitu-
tional limitations.”).
33 See generally Gene R. Shreve, Choice of Law and the Forgiving Constitution, 71 IND.
L.J. 271 (1996).
34 This list includes the Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, and the Equal Protection Clause. See James A. Martin, Constitutional Limitations on
Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 185, 185–86 (1976).
35 U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
36 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
37 See Watson v. Emp’r Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 70–74 (1954) (implying that
no true distinction existed in constitutional choice of law between the requirements imposed
by the Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S.
408 (1955) (concluding that both clauses were satisfied if the forum state has sufficient
contacts with the litigation).
38 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10 (1981) (citing Alaska Packers Assn. v.
Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 549–50 (1935)).
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reversed the regress.39 And as the first constitutional choice of law case that the
Court had heard in seventeen years, the case presented a unique opportunity to
articulate the dual constitutional underpinnings of choice of law theory.40
Moreover, the relative simplicity of the case would have allowed the Court to
outline certain fundamental principles while postponing any refinements or
elaboration for future, more difficult cases.41
Yet Justice Brennan demurred, articulating the following merged standard:
In deciding constitutional choice-of-law questions, whether under the Due Process
Clause or the Full Faith and Credit Clause, this Court has traditionally examined the
contacts of the State, whose law was applied, with the parties and with the occurrence
or transaction giving rise to the litigation. In order to ensure that the choice of law is
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair, the Court has invalidated the choice of
law of a State which has had no significant contact or significant aggregation of
contacts, creating state interests, with the parties and the occurrence or transaction.42
None of the members of the Court disagreed with Justice Brennan’s for-
mulation of that test.43 Moreover, this test was embraced by a clear majority of
the Court four years later, and continues today.44
The Court’s conclusion in Allstate that the three contacts enumerated
above satisfied this test was unpersuasive and unpopular.45 But more disturbing
than that particular dubious disposition is the case’s legacy: the suggestion that
the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses address the same concerns
and thus can be consolidated into a single constitutional inquiry.
In fact, the two clauses are designed to protect very different concerns.
Consider, first, that the Due Process Clause focuses on the relationship between
the state and the individual: no “state” can deprive any “person” of certain
39 Carroll, 349 U.S. at 413 (impliedly forbidding “any policy of hostility to the public Acts”
of another state); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 424 n.24 (1979) (observing that actions
“pose[d] no substantial threat to our constitutional system of cooperative federalism”); see
also Watson, 348 U.S. at 73.
40 See generally Gene R. Shreve, In Search of a Choice-of-Law Reviewing Standard —
Reflections on Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 66 MINN. L. REV. 327 (1982).
41 See Shreve, supra note 40, at 340 n.64; see also HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
156–57 (10th ed. 1958); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 4, 8–9
(1948).
42 Allstate, 449 U.S. at 308 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
43 See id. at 320 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 332 (Powell, J., dissenting); Courtland H.
Peterson, Particularism in the Conflict of Laws, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 973, 1009 (1982).
44 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985).
45 See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between State
and Federal Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1315, 1335 (1981); Jack Davies, A Legislator’s Look at
Hague and Choice of Law, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171 (1981); Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., A Wish-
ful Thinker’s Rehearing in the Hague Case, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1059 (1982); P. John
Kozyris, Reflections on Allstate—The Lessening of Due Process in Choice of Law, 14 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 889 (1981); James A. Martin, The Constitution and Legislative Jurisdiction,
10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 133, 141–48 (1981); Willis L.M. Reese, The Hague Case: An Opportu-
nity Lost, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 195 (1981); Silberman, supra note 31, at 103; Aaron D.
Twerski, On Territoriality and Sovereignty: System Shock and Constitutional Choice of
Law, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 149 (1981); Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Con-
stitutional Control of Choice of Law: Some Reflections on Hague, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 35
(1981).
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interests without due process of law.46 In the context of a choice-of-law deter-
mination, then, one would expect the Due Process Clause to prohibit a state
from applying a law that would unfairly compromise the litigants’ interest in
having a fair adjudication of their rights.
By contrast, the Full Faith and Credit Clause focuses on the federal inter-
est in ensuring that “each State” gives proper respect to the official acts of
“every other State.”47 The deference is to the sovereignty of the other state, not
to the personal rights of the parties.48 The purpose of the Clause is to control
excessive provincialism.49 In the context of a choice-of-law determination,
then, one would expect the Full Faith and Credit Clause, if applicable, to
require some sort of appreciation for and evaluation of the sovereign interests
of other States.50
When I teach Conflicts, I emphasize the variety of options available to the
courts to address (separately) each of these constitutional concerns. With regard
to issues of fairness under the Due Process Clause, for example, the controlling
variables could focus on notice ranging from actual to constructive, foreseeabil-
ity could be examined ex ante or ex post, the standard could be more protective
of plaintiffs or more forgiving of defendants, the inquiry could be subjective or
objective, and so forth. And with regard to issues of state sovereignty under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, there could be one of any number of balancing
tests from which the court could choose; or, more aggressively, the Court could
establish controlling principles to locate multi-jurisdiction events within a sin-
gle state for purposes of recognizing the dominant sovereign interest.
But rather than choosing from among the menu of options for each of
those clauses, the plurality suggested that there was only one test, and that the
Constitution does not interfere with the choice of law application unless the
46 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part: “No State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1; see also Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403 (1966) (The Clause “protect[s] a
person against having the Government impose burdens upon him except in accordance with
the valid laws of the land.”); Martin, supra note 34, at 192.
47 Article IV, § 1 provides: “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be
proved, and the Effect thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. See generally Martin, supra note
34, at 192.
48 See, e.g., Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 (1980) (describing
the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as the prevention of “parochial entrenchment
on the interests of other States”).
49 See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 199–200 (1963);
William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 34–41
(1963); James D. Sumner, Jr., The Full-Faith-and-Credit Clause—Its History and Purpose,
34 OR. L. REV. 224, 242 (1955).
50
“[T]he fact that conflicts cases exist in substantial numbers is a persistent reminder that
despite knowledge, shared experience, and dialogue, there really are substantial differences
of opinion about what society’s problems are and how they ought to be solved.” Southerland,
supra note 31, at 482 (footnote omitted). See generally JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 29, 33, 35 (The Lawbook Exchange 2001) (2d ed. 1841) (imply-
ing that in order for there to be “justice” in conflicts cases, the method for making the
choice-of-law decision ought to pay appropriate deference to the sovereign law-making
power of other states).
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state whose law is being applied “had no significant contact or significant
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, with the parties and the occur-
rence or transaction.”51 The combination of two clauses into a single test would
merely be an unfortunate complicator—another obfuscatory hurdle—for my
diligent students, who treat Constitutional provisions seriously, if the mandates
of both clauses were fully incorporated. Alas, such is not the case.
In Allstate, the “significant aggregation of contacts” was (i) the defen-
dant’s substantial business in the state of Minnesota; (ii) the deceased’s work
history in the state; and (iii) the nominal plaintiff’s post-accident move to the
state. With the first two of these contacts, Justice Brennan appears to be ensur-
ing the due process component: some level of fairness to the defendant. In
other words, because Allstate subjected itself to Minnesota’s laws in other con-
texts, and because Allstate knew that Mr. Hague’s commute was regularly tak-
ing him into Minnesota, Allstate could reasonably have expected (ex ante) to
be subject to Minnesota law. Indeed, case law on this point since has focused
on whether the parties could reasonably have expected that that law would be
applied.52 Although the quantum of due process protection is very modest in
light of the fact that the other business contexts and the commute had nothing
to do with this particular incident, still, the Court is engaged in the sort of
inquiry that resembles due process.
But where is the appreciation for the sovereign interests of the State of
Wisconsin? Justice Brennan used the words “creating state interests” in formu-
lating his test and he obliquely concluded that the three enumerated contacts
gave Minnesota some interest in the matter.53 This was a plausible conclusion
since the nominal plaintiff had moved to Minnesota after the accident.
Although the Court had previously rejected this as a sufficient basis for the
application of forum law,54 here that contact could also be aggregated with
Minnesota’s interest in regulating matters involving non-resident employees.55
One can fairly question the conclusion as profoundly dubious, but as far as a
conceptual framework is concerned, there is some consideration of Minnesota’s
interest in adjudicating the matter.
So, after evaluating Minnesota’s interest, then, what did Justice Brennan
require by way of consideration of Wisconsin’s interest? Or, put another way,
what does the Full Faith and Credit Clause require by way of deference to the
competing interests of the sister sovereign? Unfortunately, there was absolutely
no mention—much less thoughtful consideration or balancing—of the interests
of Wisconsin. In effect, then, other than to ensure that the forum state has some
51 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981).
52 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985) (“When considering
fairness in this context, an important element is the expectation of the parties.”).
53 Allstate, 449 U.S. at 308.
54 See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 182 (1936).
55 See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 309 (Brennan, J.) (distinguishing cases where “the selection of
forum law rested exclusively on the presence of one nonsignificant forum contact”) (empha-
sis added).
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interest—with some being a very modest qualifier here—the Full Faith and
Credit Clause plays no role in policing state choice of law determinations.56
A meaningful role for the Full Faith and Credit Clause is conspicuously
absent in the combined test. This is an unfortunate result for students and for
litigants who must contend with the Full Faith and Credit Clause, in this con-
text, as an empty promise. Allstate was a missed opportunity for the Court to
clarify whether the Clause (really) applies and, if so, what it requires. To say
that it merely requires what the Due Process Clause also requires is misleading,
as the two clauses are very different: notions of fairness are not implicated in
issues of state sovereignty.57
The absence of a meaningful role for the Full Faith and Credit Clause is
also highly consequential. Central to our political infrastructure is the notion of
state sovereignty, which “presupposes that each state will be permitted to effec-
tuate, to the extent consistent with the identical right of every other state, the
policies it adopts.”58 Through choice of law, among other disciplines, the rela-
tionship between states in our political system is defined. A robust Full Faith
and Credit Clause could ensure that the regulatory rights and interests of states
are not undermined by application of the “wrong” law. An anemic Full Faith
and Credit Clause does not interfere with a state’s determination of what law
should apply. With regard to the latter, the Allstate decision can be celebrated
as a victory for states’ rights.59 But in this context, respect for Minnesota’s
state rights (to apply its own law) comes at the expense of Wisconsin’s state
rights (to have its own law applied to contracts entered into and torts that occur
within its state boundaries).
One may fairly query why the Full Faith and Credit Clause was not
removed from the choice of law analysis altogether, as occurred with personal
jurisdiction, one year after Allstate. With personal jurisdiction, the contempo-
rary concern is about due process and fairness to the parties, with little or no
regard for the regulatory interests of the sovereign state that is deprived of
jurisdiction.60 I think this development, too, is unfortunate because of its corro-
sive effect on the regulatory interests of sovereign states; however, I was
56 Edith Freidler, Party Autonomy Revisited: A Statutory Solution to a Choice-of-Law Prob-
lem, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 471, 500 (1989) (describing how the court would no longer weigh
interests; rather it would merely find them); Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Limitations on
Choice of Law: The Perspective of Constitutional Generalism, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 59, 74
(1981) (“[S]ince all but Justice Stevens said the constitutional tests for applying a state’s law
under due process and full faith and credit are coextensive, it is reasonable to assume that
ordinarily full faith and credit will not be an independent constitutional limitation on choice
of law.”); Russell J. Weintraub, Who’s Afraid of Constitutional Limitations on Choice of
Law?, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 17, 34 (1981) (noting that, after Hague, “[i]f a choice of law
does not outrageously surprise one of the parties, it will rarely be held unconstitutional”); W.
Clark Williams, Jr., The Impact of Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague on Constitutional Limita-
tions on Choice of Law, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 489, 496 (1983).
57 Martin, supra note 34, at 195–96 (arguing that full faith and credit principles are founded
on territoriality and sovereignty, not fairness).
58 Baxter, supra note 49, at 24.
59 See Robert A. Leflar, Choice-of-Law: States’ Rights, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 203 (1981).
60 See Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guine´e, 456 U.S. 694, 702–03
n.10 (1982) (The Due Process Clause “is the only source of the personal jurisdiction require-
ment and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns.”).
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invited to criticize only one Supreme Court case, not two. But one must at least
credit the Court for its transparency in formally removing the Full Faith and
Credit Clause from the personal jurisdiction analysis. Why not do the same
here, rather than cite the clause and yet render it toothless?
Presumably the Full Faith and Credit Clause remains formally a part of the
choice of law analysis because the Court wanted the Clause to play some role
. . . someday.61 The Court may have left the Full Faith and Credit Clause in the
consolidated test as something of a placeholder—a shell until there is a better
technique for implementing its mandate. Developing an alternative to the per-
functory Allstate test is, indeed, tricky.62 The Court did not want to return to a
constitutionally mandated choice of law mode, in which a single transactional
contact is pre-selected for each category of case, then imposed inflexibly on the
states as the requisite choice of law rule.63 And yet introducing some sort of
test that required a balancing of state interests would have been difficult and
subject to criticism.64 But accepting this daunting challenge was the opportu-
nity in this “big game.” And we lost, cowardly.
61 Choice of law determinations pose a much greater threat to the integrity of the federal
system than does the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The goal of interstate allocation of
judicial business through personal jurisdiction doctrines differs from the goal of interstate
allocation of the states’ substantive policies sought to be achieved by choice of law rules.
E.g. Richard W. Mattson, Allstate Insurance Company v. Hague: Abandonment of Meaning-
ful Constitutional Controls on Choice of Law, 70 KY. L.J. 131, 148 (1981–1982); Kirt
O’Neill, Contractual Choice of Law: The Case for a New Determination of Full Faith and
Credit Limitations, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1019, 1038 (1993).
62 See generally Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda J. Silberman, Choice of Law and the
Supreme Court: A Dialogue Inspired by Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 14 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 841 (1981); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 45, at 38.
63 The Court had tried something like this with cases such as Bradford Electric Co. v. Clap-
per, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), with little success.
64 The Court had tried something like this with cases such as Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus.
Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935), with little success.
